China and North Korea - An Historical Perspective

This post is an attempt to bring some perspective into the current debate about the relationship between China and North Korea. I intend to demonstrate that the relationship between China and Korea, especially North Korea goes back for more than a millennium and needs to be understood in that context. This synthesis is based on material in John Keay's China. A History, London, 2008., though the conclusions drawn are my own

The first firm evidence for Chinese Korean relationships dates from about the first century AD.from the Han Dynasty. under the emperor Wudi. Han relationships with North Korea brought adaptiation to Chinese ways, notably in paper-making and literacy and, probably most significantly, Confucianism. While there was clearly some military conquest by China, relationships were mostly peaceful, since in this era there was no threat to China from the south. The Hans appear to have been forced out of the Korean peninsula some time in the latter part of the first century or second century AD.

During the late sixth-early seventh century the Sui dynasty mounted several disastrous invasions of North Korea, the most significant being the three failed invasions under the emperor Yangdi in 614. For a whole host of reasons Yangdi was, to put it mildly, a most unpopular emperor. His defeats in North Korea ultimately resulted in his assassination in 618, the end of the Sui Dynasty and the rise of the Tang Dynasty.

The Tang emperor Taizong was, unfortunately, driven to emulate his Sui predecessor when it came to North Korea. His two attempts to impose Chinese suzerainty on North Korea failed, the first invasion barely getting into the peninsula before being driven back. The second in 647 suffered a similar fate. Not until 669 would Tang troops enter Pyongyang. Then, under Wu Zetian, protectorates were established over the northern part of the peninsula with only the southern Korean kingdom of Silla surviving. The Tangs remained in northern Korea until 672, and were completely expelled by the resurgent Silla kingdom in 672, according to Korean sources. Nevertheless, Silla would acknowledge Chinese suzerainty and pay tribute to all dynasties up to the Southern Song in 1259.

The Mongol invasion of China and the encirclement of the Southern Song by the Mongol hordes in the same year saw a bloody invasion of the Korean peninsula and forced Korean submission and a new acknowledgement of Mongol suzerainty. The Koreans appear to have been left in relative peace until 1274, when they were forced to be the reluctant staging point of Khubilai's disastrous attempt at invading Japan. The Japanese did not forget. In the 1590s they invaded Korea, forcing the Ming Dynasty into a long, unwanted war.

The next significant involvement of Korea with the Chinese came under the victorious Manchus in 1620 when the Manchu Hong Taiji transformed Chinese military strategy via artillery and siegecraft, and the formation of the famed Manchu Bannerman, who recruited many Koreans for their regiments.

In the sixteenth century Western observers at the Chinese court, like the Jesuit Matthew Ricci, were appalled by Sino-Japanese warfare on the Korean peninsula, but they were bystanders. By and in the nineteenth century,  Korea had sent regular missions to the Manchu emperors, but essentially they maintained their independence. Japanese attempts to follow Western example and establish treaty ports on the Korean peninsula, as the West had done with China, led to the various Western powers, with Chinese encouragement, seek to open their own treaty ports on the peninsula. An internal Korean rebellion in 1894 resulted in the Korean king seeking Chinese troops. The Japanese responded by sending larger forces of their own. The result was war between the Quing court and the Japanese. For the Chinese the war was a complete disaster, leading to a Japanese invasion of China and a humiliating peace in 1895, which virtually made Korea a Japanese protectorate. Chinese influence in Korea was at an end, or so it seemed.

To understand what happened next we have to fast forward to the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As Japanese defeat seemed certain Soviet Russia and the United States rushed to occupy Japanese territory in Korea. At war's end the peninsula was partitioned along the line of occupation, the 38th parallel. In June 1950 North Korea, now Communist and sharing an ideological brotherhood with the victorious Chinese Communists who had established the People's Republic of China in 1949, invaded the American supported south in the name of Korean 'integration'. The subsequent Korean War was fought to a stalemate, with the Peoples' Republic backing Northern Korean Communists with the participation of  up to a million soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. Korea, when the armistice finally came in 1954, was divided into communist and capitalist blocs. China maintains its support of its intransigent southern ally to this day.

But, looking back over the millennium of history what can we conclude about the Chinese-North Korean relationship? Clearly, it goes back much further than a sympathy between two Communist allies. China has shed much blood over and in support of Korea, including an invasion of their own soil by the Japanese, followed by a humiliating capitulation (1895). For centuries the Korean kingdoms were tributaries of Imperial China. To a limited extent, Korea was acculturated by its giant northern neighbour, in much the way, say ,that modern Australia was acculturated by Great Britain. It is not a bond that will be easily broken. North Korea in particular has always been viewed by the Chinese, Imperial, republican and Communist, as a legitimate Chinese sphere of influence. This brief essay is an attempt to explain why, regardless of the antics of the North Korean Communist dictatorship, such a strong bond exists between the two nations. 

And as to their joint future? that is speculation, and speculation is not the business of history.

The Interrupted Performance of General Johnny Burgoyne's 'The Blockade of Boston' January 8, 1776

Boston under siege in January 1776 was a most unpleasant place to be. Fuel was scarce, so scarce that the British Commander-in-Chief, William Howe had authorised the pulling down and burning of the houses and wharves belonging to rebel supporters. There were no fresh provisions. Expected storeships from Britain had failed to arrive. Smallpox had broken out, but fortunately had not reached epidemic proportions. In the bitter winter, though not so bitter as to freeze up Boston Harbor and allow the Americans rebels under Washington to stage an attack to the Boston peninsula's Back Bay from the west, the greatest danger for the British was boredom. To the town's north east, soldiers froze in their tents on the Charlestown Peninsula on the redoubt on Bunker Hill, secured with much blood the previous June and in the outposts on Charlestown Neck, beyond which was rebel-held territory.

British officers and the town's wealthier Loyalists tried to boost morale with balls, concerts, and most importantly, plays, which were performed twice a week on the upper floor of Faneuil Hall, former meeting place of the rebel Sons of Liberty, now 'fitted up very Elegantly for a Theatre' [Lieut. William Feilding to Lord Denbigh, Boston, Jany. 19, 1776 in Marion Balderston and David Syrett (ed.) The Lost War. letters from British Officers during the American Revolution, New York, 1975. p. 58] much to the chagrin of Boston Puritans.

Though theatre had flourished in other major colonial towns, even Philadelphia, to the scorn of the Quakers, since 1750 the Massachusetts General Court had banned the performance of plays because they caused 'great mischiefs', militated against 'industry and frugality' and, most importantly, increased 'immorality, impiety and a contempt for religion.' [Jacqueline Barbara Carr, After the Siege. A Social History of Boston, 1775-1800, Boston, p.199]. This all changed with the arrival of General Johnny Burgoyne, who had set up the Faneuil Hall theatre by about December 1775.

Burgoyne was not only a noted soldier and inept politician. He was also a celebrated playwright. His two-act musical comedy, The Maid of Oaks, (later staged in Boston) had opened to a very mixed reception at the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, on November 12, 1774. Horace Walpole thought it 'as dull as the author could not help making it' though Burgoyne's modern biographer notes the 'work became a prototype of a new form of musical comedy, which reflected the influence of middle-class tastes upon dramatic productions.' [Richard Hargrove, Jr. General John Burgoyne. Newark, 1983, pp.63-64]. And Boston was nothing if not middle-class. 

So, on the night of January 8, 1776, the British officers off-duty and the Boston Loyalist elite flocked to Faneuil Hall for performances of Susanna Centlivre's The Busy Body (a 1709 farce) and the premiere of Burgoyne's The Blockade of Boston. The latter was looked forward to with much enthusiasm, as a biting satire on the besieging rebels with all the roles being performed by officers. It was not to be. Across the water the same rebels were planning a raid on the Charlestown peninsula, timed for 9 o'clock, the exact time the curtain was due to rise on Burgoyne's musical fare.

Major Thomas Knowlton with one hundred men had orders 'to go and burn some houses which lay at the foot of Bunker's Hill and at the head of' the now ruined village of 'Charles Town' and 'to bring of the Guard which we expected consisted of an officer and thirty men.' The guard was not there, but with much noise the rebels did burn 'eight houses and brought with them a' drunken 'Sergeant and 4' inebriated 'privates of the 10th regiment, and a woman they were entertaining in one of the deserted houses' A fifth man was killed because he resisted. On Bunker Hill the flashing of the musketry from every quarter of that fort showed the confusion of its defenders - firing some into the air, some in the Mystick river; in short, they fired at random and thought they were attacked at every quarter.' [George Washington to Continental Congress, January 11, 1776 in The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript sources, 1745-1799, John C. Fitzpatrick, Editor, American Memory, The George Washington Papers of the Library of Congress, 1741-1799, http://memory.loc.gov 6/8/06; Extract of a letter from Cambridge, January 9, 1776, in Peter Force (ed.) American Archives,S4-V4-p.612] General Howe was deeply angered when he heard of the  confused British reaction but their confusion was nothing compared to what happened at Faneuil Hall.

An orderly sergeant outside the theatre raised the alarm crying 'Turn Out! Turn Out!' but the audience burst into applause at his appearance, mistaking him for a character in the play. When the applause died down 'he again cried out, 'What the d---l are ye about? If ye won't believe me ye need only to go to the door, and there ye'll hear and see both!' ' Finally convinced the alarm was serious, the officers rushed to their alarm stations, 'one officer was running to his Corps in his petticoats, and another with his faced blacked and in a Negro dress.' Others 'calling out for water to get the paint and smut off their faces, women fainting, etc.' Ensign Martin Hunter believed 'The enemy knew the night it was to be performed and made an attack on the mill at Charleston at the very hour the farce began;' [General Martin Hunter's Journal in G. D. Scull (ed.) The Evelyns in America, Oxford, 1881, pp. 189-190, f/n; Lieut. William Feilding to lord Denbigh, op. cit.,; cited in David McCullough, 1776. America and Britain at War, London, 2005, p.75] In fact, the Americans did not hear about the play's premiere until three days after the raid. [Cambridge, January 11, 1776 in Peter Force (ed.) American Archives, S4-V.4_p. 613, f/n.]

The piece was finally performed without interruption at the end of January, along with Marlowe's Tamerlane. One member of the audience thought '[t]he Characters of the Yankee General [Washington] and the Figure of his Soldiers is inimitable, the Genl: a man who cant Read but can Speachifye, and tell his soldiers they are to obey the Voice of the people in the streets, the Joy the Rebels are in, in reading the Resolve of the Mayor and City of London in favour of the Con-ti-nen-tal Congress in Ph-li-del-phia pa-per is truly Characteristick.' Another thought 'the Audience Expected something better from the Abilities of the Authors. its but a poor performance.' [Lieutenant William Feilding to Lord Denbigh, Boston Jany 28th, 1776 in Balderston and Syrett, op. cit., p.64; Francis Hutcheson to Major General Frederick Haldemand, Boston, January, 25th, 1776 in William Bell Clark, (ed.) Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Vol. 3, Washington, 1968, p.970.

Within less than two months, the despised rebel general would drive the British from Boston, never to return, Legal theatre would not return to Boston until 1794. [Jacqueline Barbara Carr, op. cit., p.221.]

The Travails of Robert Gordon Menzies in the 1940-41 Minority Government

In my last post I considered the relationship between Labor's John Curtin and the United Australia Party's )UAP) Robert Menzies during the Menzies' minority Government of 1940-41. In this post I am going to concentrate on Menzies; difficulties within the UAP over the period of his minority Government. My intention is to show how recent Liberal Party claims that Curtin refused Menzies a pair to travel to London in 1941 are disingenuous, at best, if not completely untruthful.

The election debacle of September 1940 had grave ramifications for the conservative Coalition. Within the Country Party there was a fight for the leadership between 'Black Jack" McEwen and Earle Page. Artie Fadden was elected to the leadership as a compromise candidate and the former United Country Party (UCP) leader, Archie Cameron, not even nominated for the leadership, left the party in high dudgeon and joined the UAP. Arthur Coles, elected as aVictorian Independent, also joined the UAP. In his reconstruction of the UAP Cabinet, Menzies gave the post of Treasurer to Fadden, much to the ire of the UAP's Percy Spender, who had been Treasurer in the former Menzies Government. He had gained the post because in April 1939 Earle Page had taken the UCP out of the Coalition because of his dislike of Menzies whom he had blamed for hounding the UAP's founding Leader, Joe Lyons, to his death. Spender, instead, was made Minister for the Army.

Negotiations with Labor and Lang Labor after the September election led to the formation of the Advisory War Council (AWC). Most significantly, for the argument I am currently advancing, John Curtin, the Labor Opposition leader guaranteed not to use Labor's numbers in the Parliament to embarrass the Government in its war effort. On 24 January, 1941, accompanied by Frederick Shedden, the Secretary for Defence, Menzies departed Australia for London via the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore and the Middle East. He was determined to induce Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, to be specific as to how he intended to reinforce Singapore and draw up a plan for the defence of the Far East. He wanted, too, an exact explanation from Churchill as to how he would make good his pledge of defending Australia from Japanese invasion.

Much of the detail of Menzies' discussions with the British Government and British defence authorities need not concern us. However, one detail is significant for its effect on politics back in Australia. In discussions with the British Foreign Office Menzies was shocked to discover the British had reservations about reinforcing Singapore with aircraft to guard against war in the Far East because the planes could be ill-spared from the European war. Nor would they engage in war with Japan unless American intervention was guaranteed. He warned the British that if the Japanese invaded the Netherlands East Indies , 'the whole Australian defence policy and plans would have to be recast.'

In an attempt to change Foreign Office thinking, Menzies gave a luncheon speech to the Foreign Press Association on 3 March. He reiterated publicly the views he had expressed to the Foreign Office and called for frankness with Japan and a 'proper blend of friendliness and plain statement'. Australia, he warned, he warned would nevertheless defend herself and her vital interests.

Back home, Curtin, Beasley and the press accused him of minimising the seriousness of the position in the Pacific and contradicting warnings the AWC had issued in February about the Japanese threat. This response disgusted Menzies and reinforced an unfortunate (and untrue) perception in the Australian electorate that he was, somehow, an appeaser of Fascism. By April Spender, concerned by Australian defeats in Northern Africa and Greece did not augur well for the Government's popularity or for Army morale, tried to persuade the War Cabinet to appoint a Commander-in-Chief  of the AMF (Australian Military Forces) to be designated "Commander-in-Chief Australia'. Because of opposition from the Military Board and Defence Committee, he was forced to compromise with the appointment 'of the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the Field Army'. His suggestion was adopted to counter strong political pressure being applied in the Advisory War Council by Labor members about the need to give Australian defence priority over Imperial commitments. This strategem temporarily squelched Labor protests. The appointment was not made until 11 July, but did not clearly define the lines of authority and command within the military bureaucracy for the appointee, General Sir Iven Mackay.)
Menzies, now in Washington, was not impressed when Fadden cabled him about the decision. Perhaps he became suspicious that Spender had pretensions to the leadership of the UAP. On the trip home on 25 April the thought of political rivalries in Canberra gave him 'a sick feeling of repugnance and apprehension.' On 13 June, following a further Australian defeat in Crete earlier that month, Menzies decided to free himself from the pressure of administrative duties to 'better exercise a general supervision over the wart effort on the military and economic fronts.' This culminated in his public broadcast on 17 June, exhorting the Australian public to an 'all-in' effort. On 26 June he re-organised his Cabinet. But the Cabinet reconstruction brought into the open dissension within the UAP about Menzies' leadership, especially from those who had been passed over for a portfolio.
The political pressure for the Government to be seen doing something for the defence of the continent had intensified since April. On 28 July, a joint Franco-Japanese protectorate was declared over Indo-China. Australia, following the lead of Britain and the United States, froze Japanese assets. Forde and Makin in the Advisory War Council, on 29 July forced the Government on the defensive about its policy of concentrating Australia's defence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the face of Japanese bellicosity. Spender pointed out that the Government had despatched brigades of the 8th Division to Malaya and Darwin, had taken steps to call up 35,000 men in the home forces for full-time duty, including four detachments at Rabaul and Thursday Island, and had instituted a more efficient training programme for the militia less than a week before. Spender's argument ignored the chronic equipment deficiencies within the AMF about which the Labor men had recently been informed.
Menzies, meanwhile, was having serious problems within the UAP. At the end of July he had fended off a challenge to his leadership exacerbated by calls within the Labor Party for him to be deposed.and grew more and more preoccupied with attempts within his own party to topple him and was less able to give full attention to his Ministerial obligations. In a desperate attempt to salvage his leadership he suggested that he might go once more to London where, through the British War Cabinet he might be able to better influence decisions that would affect Australia's defence. The former World War I Prime Minister, the ancient Billy Hughes,  who once more had visions of himself as Australia's war-time leader, strongly urged this idea on his threatened leader. Labor would have none of it. Convinced that the Menzies Government was close to derelict in its responsibility for the nation's home defence, and confident that they alone could save Australia from the looming Japanese threat, Curtin refused to give Menzies a pair for what he believed was a second useless trip to London. They knew Menzies would fall if he remained in Australia.
On 28 August Menzies resigned as Prime Minister, leaving the way open for Fadden, a candidate thought more acceptable to the electorate. Fadden had no illusions about the task before him. He made no changes to the Menzies Cabinet, and determined to use Meanzies' expertise, allowed him to retain the portfolio of Defence Co-ordination.
It is clear from the above that Curtin refused to pair Menzies' second trip to London because he believed the Coalition was unfit to manage the war, a view that was shared by Arthur Coles, again an Independent, who in October crossed the floor of the House and put the Labor Party into Government. When the current shadow Treasurer, Joe Hockey, claimed Curtin had refused Menzies a pair to go to London, he can only have been referring to this latter occasion. That he neglected to explain the circumstances behind the refusal of a pair, namely that in time of great peril, Australia was being governed by a disunited party incapable of dealing with the threat of Japanese invasion in the near future, and which had left the country in a state on unpreparedness to meet such an invasion, at the very least puts his assertion in the realm of a half-truth, to say the least.

The Curtin Opposition and the Menzies Minority Government of 1940-41

Over the past few days the Abbott Opposition to Gillard's minority Government has been putting around the furphy that somehow John Curtin, Australian wartime Opposition Leader, was involved in attempts to destabilise Robert Menzies' wartime Government, as a justification for its current obstructiveness.  It is time to put this outrageous lie to rest. I propose to do that by examining in some detail the Curtin Opposition's relationship withe the Menzies 1940-41 Government.

After the 1940 election Menzies, seeking a way out of the political difficulties created by the Independents holding the balance of power, approached Curtin to form a National Government. Curtin responded by suggesting the Labor proposal of an Advisory War Council. After some negotiation the parties arrived at an agreement. The Labor Party promised to co-operate with the Government in its attempts to strengthen the war effort, to deal with internal security matters and in preparations for the immediate postwar period. It would not use its numbers in the Parliament to embarrass the Government in its war effort. (This last condition is worth noting. It puts the lie to Joe Hockey's claim that Curtin did not pair Menzies when Menzies went to London and Washington in January 1941.) All members of the Council, Menzies, Fadden, Spender and Hughes for the Government, Curtin, Forde, along with Makin for Labor and Beasley for Lang Labor were sworn in 'to respect all confidences.'

On 13 February, 1941, after an Advisory War Council meeting held about two and a half weeks after Menzies had departed for London to impress on Churchill the potential danger Australia faced from Japan, Curtin issued a joint statement with the acting Prime Minister, Artie Fadden that 'effective preparatory measures' were being taken to put Australia on a war footing. Curtin faced severe criticism within the Parliamentary Labor Party for his association with the joint warnings when Fadden was forced to justify his statements against the charge that he was a panic merchant. Eddie Ward, the Labor member for East Sydney, labelled the warnings a hoax. To counter this, Fadden called a secret session of Parliament to discuss the impending Japanese threat, and the measures taken to counter that threat. This was not achieved without drama. Eddie Ward refused to give an undertaking to keep secret matters disclosed at the closed session and was ejected from the House. His behaviour resulted from his conviction that the Menzies led .coalition was not fit to govern and should be attacked on any grounds regardless of the danger to national security. 

Menzies returned to Australia at the end of April, 1941 On 27 June Eddie Ward seconded a Caucus motion 'that in the interests of the people and for the safety of the nation' the Labor Party pledge itself to defeat Menzies in the House 'not later than the next Budget.' This gave the Party just over a two month deadline. The motion was nullified by a Curtin supported amendment.

Menzies was having serious problems within his United Australia Party. At the end of July he had fended off a challenge to his leadership exacerbated by calls from within the Labor Party for him to be deposed. Despite pressure from Dr. H. V. Evatt, who had pronounced himself Curtin's natural successor when it appeared the Labor leader might lose his seat in the 1940 election, and from Beasley, Curtin refused to commit himself publicly to Menzies' overthrow. 

At the suggestion of some of his Cabinet colleagues Menzies put forward the idea that he might go again to London, so the Australian voice could be 'directly heard in the place in which the major decisions are inevitably made' - the British War Cabinet. Hughes, his eyes on the Prime Ministership yet again, was one of the most forceful advocates of this plan. But Labor, with the balance of power in the House of Representatives, would not give their assent to the visit. They believed the Prime Minister should be in Australia to direct the administration of the war effort and knew Menzies would fail if forced to stay in Australia. (This is the only instance where Curtin denied Menzies a pair, and, under the circumstances facing Menzies, Labor's attitude is perfectly understandable politically.) On 28 August, after consulting his wife and parents, Menzies bowed to intra-party pressure and resigned.

George Johnston at Bunker Hill -Reflections on New Evidence

A little while ago I did a post on eleven year old George Johnston's experiences at Bunker Hill. My interpretation of the evidence for Johnston's action was based on several assumptions implied in the evidence I had gathered to that date: 1) that Johnston was in Boston with his parents  2) that he had not yet joined the Marines 3)  that consequently he was a spectator not a participant in the battle of Bunker Hill 4) that because he was with his wife in Boston, Johnston's father, Captain David Johnston was nursed by his wife in their rented residence in Boston.

New evidence that has come to light has overturned all these assumptions. Young George actually joined the Marines as a ten year old in October 1774 and came to Boston alone with his father in January 1775. His father went went with Lord Percy's First Brigade to relief Lt. Colonel Francis Smith at Lexington after the latter's disastrous retreat from Concord. Young George remained in Boston.

Bunker Hill was George's first experience of battle. He was in the rear line of the third attack against the Breed's Hill redoubt, where, according to the Johnston family tradition, he took the regimental standard from the hands of a dying ensign and rushed to the front of the battle. It is unlikely he saw his father, seriously wounded in the chest during the storming of the Breed's Hill redoubt, until he was brought down to the beach at the battle's end. David Johnston's wound was most likely treated in one of the hastily established regimental hospitals in Boston town., Though the wound was serious, he did recover, leaving his son behind in Boston when he was returned to England with the rest of the wounded several months later.

My narrative of George Johnston's time in Boston changed because new evidence came to light. This raises interesting questions about the nature of history. How can two completely different narratives, both based on reasonable evidence, arise out of the same sequence of events. The first narrative, in an earlier post, obviously was partly, though not entirely, fiction. The second narrative is probably the more accurate. So how close to fiction can history get?  Or, to put it another way, when is history wrong and when is it right, if it is ever right, once you stray beyond the basic established facts of a narrative? These are among the questions about the philosophy of history I have pondered most of my adult life, but as is ever the case with philosophy have never been able to come up with a definitive answer.They are worth pondering, even if they are irresolvable.

Independents in the Australian Federal Parliament - A War-time Case Study

The 21 September 1940 Australian federal election did not augur well for the conservative parties with dissension in the United Australia Party (UAP) and a United Country Party much discontented under the rambunctious leadership of Archie Cameron who had succeeded Earle Page. Both the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the UAP-UCP campaigned on the issue of who was best fitted to lead the nation in war. However, there were significant side issues of petrol rationing and a defence of the sectional interests of wheat growers in the Wimmera. The latter campaign resulted in the election of Alex Wilson as an Independent. He was accompanied into Parliament by Arthur Coles, another Independent, who was determined to goad the major parties to a more effective and united war effort. When the poll was declared, Labor and the coalition had gained 36 seats each, with the Independents holding the balance of power in the House of Representatives. John Curtin, the Labor leader, narrowly held his seat of Fremantle where the poll was in doubt for some days. The UAP retained power in the Senate.

The election debacle resulted in a fight for the leadership within the Country Party. Artie Fadden became compromise acting leader over John McEwen and Page, and thus Deputy Prime Minister. Not even nominated for Country Party leadership Cameron left the party in disgust and joined the UAP. Coles, a fervent supporter of the UAP Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, joined the UAP.

The intra-party infighting in mid to late 1941 that led to Menzies resigning the UAP leadership in August 1941 need not concern us greatly. His resignation left the way open for Fadden to become Prime Minister because he was thought a candidate more acceptable to the electorate. On 3 October Arthur Coles,  -who had again turned Independent after Menzies' fall - dissatisfied with the defence policies of the coalition and disillusioned with UAP disloyalty to their former leader, crossed the floor of the House giving Curtin a majority in the House of Representatives. He supported the Curtin Government in no confidence motions and the provision of supply until June, 1943. The circumstances that led him to withdraw that support in that month are worth examining in some detail.

In October 1942, during the Victorian state election campaign, Eddie Ward, the Labor member for East Sydney, alleged that under the Menzies Government there had been 'a plan in existence ... for the abandonment of an important part of Northern Australia without firing a single shot.' Over the succeeding months Ward turned this allegation into an attack on the Menzies Government's lack of defence preparedness, which in turn changed to the more serious allegation that Menzies had a plan to abandon all of Australia north of a line drawn from Maryborough in Queensland diagonally to Adelaide and/or Albany in Western Australia to the Japanese in event of invasion. Ward's claims (which were inaccurate) were vigorously denied by Menzies. Ward though, continued to make the claims and Curtin did nothing to stop him. Eventually Opposition anger grew so fierce that Ward's claims of a Brisbane Line formed the major part of an Opposition no confidence motion against the Curtin Government beginning in the afternoon of 22 June, 1943. During that debate Eddie Ward, pressed for  evidence of his allegation, made the extraordinary assertion that he had been 'reliably informed that there was a document missing from official files' that pertained to the Brisbane Line.In his speech on the no confidence motion, Coles made no reference to the issue.

In private discussions with Curtin Ward refused to disclose the name of his informant. The controversy surrounding Ward's allegation of a missing document grew so intense, both inside and outside of Parliament, that Curtin soon realised there would have to be an investigation into its accuracy. Menzies and the Opposition demanded a Royal Commission, and that Ward stand down from Cabinet. He repeated this demand the next day in during a  debate that the no-confidence motion be adjourned,that there should be a Royal Commission into the Brisbane Line allegations. Cole hesitated before  voting in support of the Labor Government. Earle Page, speaking for the Opposition in a subsequent Budget Estimates debate, urged the refusal of Supply in the Opposition controlled Senate until Curtin agreed to a Royal Commission. At this point, Coles, who had come under considerable pressure, privately informed Curtin that he intended to vote to refuse Supply.

Curtin, ever the clever politician, relieved Ward of his Cabinet post and announced a Royal Commission. Because he had acceded to the Royal Commission rather than having it voted on from the floor of the Parliament Ward could claim parliamentary privilege when he testified before it, and he had kept Coles's vote.

The UAP-UCP Opposition were not finished with the issue yet though. They decided to block Supply in the  wartime Senate unless Curtin consented to a dissolution of Parliament. Curtin did so, later that night before an almost empty House.
In the subsequent election on August 21, Labor won 49 seats to the Coalition's 23. Both Independents retained their seats, though Coles had to go to preferences. His influence over the Government of the day was at an end.

On Finding Books

Its been a while since I've posted on my blog. I've been in the throes of researching the Siege of Boston (1775-1776) and have actually begun writing chapter 6 of my book. The chapter is about the first months of the siege of Boston from June 1775 after the battle of Bunker Hill to the point in December 1775 where the Americans ready to make the final blow on the besieged British. Have also been researching the British in Halifax from April to May 1775, and the chapter on the Ethiopian Brigade in Virginia in 1775-1776. At the moment I'm waiting for about twenty one books to arrive, one on Halifax, which will almost complete my research on that chapter apart from some documents and a journal I've found on line which is not in print in book form.

One book I've been able to find which I've been trying to get for several years and have finally located at a reasonable price is Lieut. Williams Discord and Civil Wars .. And I've finally been able to afford to buy Alan Frost's The Global Reach of Empire, recommended to me by my ex-supervisor for this book. It will, I hope be very useful for setting the exploits of the First Fleeters in the American War of Independence in a wider global context. (And I very much  like Frost's work anyway.) I'm also getting Allen French's The Siege of Boston. I don't know if it will simply reiterate material in his magisterial The First Year of the American Revolution, which was written after he'd completed the former book, but I can't take the risk of missing something out.  I'm also getting Volume 5 of the Naval Documents of the American Revolution, which will be very useful for both my research into Halifax and the latter stages of Lord Dunmore's failed Virginian campaign. Another book which will be infinitely useful is Stedman's The History of the Origin, Progress and Termination of the American War. So far I'm only getting volume one. It is the only contemporary history written from the British side, and I hope it will be very useful.

On the American side I'm getting Thacher's Journal, three journals by ordinary soldiers in the Continental army, (though I'm not sure if one of them deals with Boston. I bought it on spec as it turned up in a sidebar in the bookseller's confirmation of a purchase); and a book on Washington's Navy and another on his generals. I;m also getting Selby's history of the American Revolution in Virginia, which I expect to be very good. So I have more than enough to keep me busy for a while, and that I'll be able to get back to writing chapter 5 pretty soon.