The Curtin Opposition and the Menzies Minority Government of 1940-41

Over the past few days the Abbott Opposition to Gillard's minority Government has been putting around the furphy that somehow John Curtin, Australian wartime Opposition Leader, was involved in attempts to destabilise Robert Menzies' wartime Government, as a justification for its current obstructiveness.  It is time to put this outrageous lie to rest. I propose to do that by examining in some detail the Curtin Opposition's relationship withe the Menzies 1940-41 Government.

After the 1940 election Menzies, seeking a way out of the political difficulties created by the Independents holding the balance of power, approached Curtin to form a National Government. Curtin responded by suggesting the Labor proposal of an Advisory War Council. After some negotiation the parties arrived at an agreement. The Labor Party promised to co-operate with the Government in its attempts to strengthen the war effort, to deal with internal security matters and in preparations for the immediate postwar period. It would not use its numbers in the Parliament to embarrass the Government in its war effort. (This last condition is worth noting. It puts the lie to Joe Hockey's claim that Curtin did not pair Menzies when Menzies went to London and Washington in January 1941.) All members of the Council, Menzies, Fadden, Spender and Hughes for the Government, Curtin, Forde, along with Makin for Labor and Beasley for Lang Labor were sworn in 'to respect all confidences.'

On 13 February, 1941, after an Advisory War Council meeting held about two and a half weeks after Menzies had departed for London to impress on Churchill the potential danger Australia faced from Japan, Curtin issued a joint statement with the acting Prime Minister, Artie Fadden that 'effective preparatory measures' were being taken to put Australia on a war footing. Curtin faced severe criticism within the Parliamentary Labor Party for his association with the joint warnings when Fadden was forced to justify his statements against the charge that he was a panic merchant. Eddie Ward, the Labor member for East Sydney, labelled the warnings a hoax. To counter this, Fadden called a secret session of Parliament to discuss the impending Japanese threat, and the measures taken to counter that threat. This was not achieved without drama. Eddie Ward refused to give an undertaking to keep secret matters disclosed at the closed session and was ejected from the House. His behaviour resulted from his conviction that the Menzies led .coalition was not fit to govern and should be attacked on any grounds regardless of the danger to national security. 

Menzies returned to Australia at the end of April, 1941 On 27 June Eddie Ward seconded a Caucus motion 'that in the interests of the people and for the safety of the nation' the Labor Party pledge itself to defeat Menzies in the House 'not later than the next Budget.' This gave the Party just over a two month deadline. The motion was nullified by a Curtin supported amendment.

Menzies was having serious problems within his United Australia Party. At the end of July he had fended off a challenge to his leadership exacerbated by calls from within the Labor Party for him to be deposed. Despite pressure from Dr. H. V. Evatt, who had pronounced himself Curtin's natural successor when it appeared the Labor leader might lose his seat in the 1940 election, and from Beasley, Curtin refused to commit himself publicly to Menzies' overthrow. 

At the suggestion of some of his Cabinet colleagues Menzies put forward the idea that he might go again to London, so the Australian voice could be 'directly heard in the place in which the major decisions are inevitably made' - the British War Cabinet. Hughes, his eyes on the Prime Ministership yet again, was one of the most forceful advocates of this plan. But Labor, with the balance of power in the House of Representatives, would not give their assent to the visit. They believed the Prime Minister should be in Australia to direct the administration of the war effort and knew Menzies would fail if forced to stay in Australia. (This is the only instance where Curtin denied Menzies a pair, and, under the circumstances facing Menzies, Labor's attitude is perfectly understandable politically.) On 28 August, after consulting his wife and parents, Menzies bowed to intra-party pressure and resigned.

George Johnston at Bunker Hill -Reflections on New Evidence

A little while ago I did a post on eleven year old George Johnston's experiences at Bunker Hill. My interpretation of the evidence for Johnston's action was based on several assumptions implied in the evidence I had gathered to that date: 1) that Johnston was in Boston with his parents  2) that he had not yet joined the Marines 3)  that consequently he was a spectator not a participant in the battle of Bunker Hill 4) that because he was with his wife in Boston, Johnston's father, Captain David Johnston was nursed by his wife in their rented residence in Boston.

New evidence that has come to light has overturned all these assumptions. Young George actually joined the Marines as a ten year old in October 1774 and came to Boston alone with his father in January 1775. His father went went with Lord Percy's First Brigade to relief Lt. Colonel Francis Smith at Lexington after the latter's disastrous retreat from Concord. Young George remained in Boston.

Bunker Hill was George's first experience of battle. He was in the rear line of the third attack against the Breed's Hill redoubt, where, according to the Johnston family tradition, he took the regimental standard from the hands of a dying ensign and rushed to the front of the battle. It is unlikely he saw his father, seriously wounded in the chest during the storming of the Breed's Hill redoubt, until he was brought down to the beach at the battle's end. David Johnston's wound was most likely treated in one of the hastily established regimental hospitals in Boston town., Though the wound was serious, he did recover, leaving his son behind in Boston when he was returned to England with the rest of the wounded several months later.

My narrative of George Johnston's time in Boston changed because new evidence came to light. This raises interesting questions about the nature of history. How can two completely different narratives, both based on reasonable evidence, arise out of the same sequence of events. The first narrative, in an earlier post, obviously was partly, though not entirely, fiction. The second narrative is probably the more accurate. So how close to fiction can history get?  Or, to put it another way, when is history wrong and when is it right, if it is ever right, once you stray beyond the basic established facts of a narrative? These are among the questions about the philosophy of history I have pondered most of my adult life, but as is ever the case with philosophy have never been able to come up with a definitive answer.They are worth pondering, even if they are irresolvable.

Independents in the Australian Federal Parliament - A War-time Case Study

The 21 September 1940 Australian federal election did not augur well for the conservative parties with dissension in the United Australia Party (UAP) and a United Country Party much discontented under the rambunctious leadership of Archie Cameron who had succeeded Earle Page. Both the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the UAP-UCP campaigned on the issue of who was best fitted to lead the nation in war. However, there were significant side issues of petrol rationing and a defence of the sectional interests of wheat growers in the Wimmera. The latter campaign resulted in the election of Alex Wilson as an Independent. He was accompanied into Parliament by Arthur Coles, another Independent, who was determined to goad the major parties to a more effective and united war effort. When the poll was declared, Labor and the coalition had gained 36 seats each, with the Independents holding the balance of power in the House of Representatives. John Curtin, the Labor leader, narrowly held his seat of Fremantle where the poll was in doubt for some days. The UAP retained power in the Senate.

The election debacle resulted in a fight for the leadership within the Country Party. Artie Fadden became compromise acting leader over John McEwen and Page, and thus Deputy Prime Minister. Not even nominated for Country Party leadership Cameron left the party in disgust and joined the UAP. Coles, a fervent supporter of the UAP Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, joined the UAP.

The intra-party infighting in mid to late 1941 that led to Menzies resigning the UAP leadership in August 1941 need not concern us greatly. His resignation left the way open for Fadden to become Prime Minister because he was thought a candidate more acceptable to the electorate. On 3 October Arthur Coles,  -who had again turned Independent after Menzies' fall - dissatisfied with the defence policies of the coalition and disillusioned with UAP disloyalty to their former leader, crossed the floor of the House giving Curtin a majority in the House of Representatives. He supported the Curtin Government in no confidence motions and the provision of supply until June, 1943. The circumstances that led him to withdraw that support in that month are worth examining in some detail.

In October 1942, during the Victorian state election campaign, Eddie Ward, the Labor member for East Sydney, alleged that under the Menzies Government there had been 'a plan in existence ... for the abandonment of an important part of Northern Australia without firing a single shot.' Over the succeeding months Ward turned this allegation into an attack on the Menzies Government's lack of defence preparedness, which in turn changed to the more serious allegation that Menzies had a plan to abandon all of Australia north of a line drawn from Maryborough in Queensland diagonally to Adelaide and/or Albany in Western Australia to the Japanese in event of invasion. Ward's claims (which were inaccurate) were vigorously denied by Menzies. Ward though, continued to make the claims and Curtin did nothing to stop him. Eventually Opposition anger grew so fierce that Ward's claims of a Brisbane Line formed the major part of an Opposition no confidence motion against the Curtin Government beginning in the afternoon of 22 June, 1943. During that debate Eddie Ward, pressed for  evidence of his allegation, made the extraordinary assertion that he had been 'reliably informed that there was a document missing from official files' that pertained to the Brisbane Line.In his speech on the no confidence motion, Coles made no reference to the issue.

In private discussions with Curtin Ward refused to disclose the name of his informant. The controversy surrounding Ward's allegation of a missing document grew so intense, both inside and outside of Parliament, that Curtin soon realised there would have to be an investigation into its accuracy. Menzies and the Opposition demanded a Royal Commission, and that Ward stand down from Cabinet. He repeated this demand the next day in during a  debate that the no-confidence motion be adjourned,that there should be a Royal Commission into the Brisbane Line allegations. Cole hesitated before  voting in support of the Labor Government. Earle Page, speaking for the Opposition in a subsequent Budget Estimates debate, urged the refusal of Supply in the Opposition controlled Senate until Curtin agreed to a Royal Commission. At this point, Coles, who had come under considerable pressure, privately informed Curtin that he intended to vote to refuse Supply.

Curtin, ever the clever politician, relieved Ward of his Cabinet post and announced a Royal Commission. Because he had acceded to the Royal Commission rather than having it voted on from the floor of the Parliament Ward could claim parliamentary privilege when he testified before it, and he had kept Coles's vote.

The UAP-UCP Opposition were not finished with the issue yet though. They decided to block Supply in the  wartime Senate unless Curtin consented to a dissolution of Parliament. Curtin did so, later that night before an almost empty House.
In the subsequent election on August 21, Labor won 49 seats to the Coalition's 23. Both Independents retained their seats, though Coles had to go to preferences. His influence over the Government of the day was at an end.